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ABSTRACT
On November26, 2001, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that
Indian reservations were established as homelands. By articulating
a homeland standard for the measure of reserved water rights based
on tribal economic development plans, cultural needs, and historic
water uses, the Arizona Supreme Court has eliminated many of the
blatant inequities plaguing the current approach to Indian water
rights quantification. Nevertheless, there are concerns with
wholesale adoption of the Arizona standard, including the effect on
those who have devoted resources in reliance on the previous
standard, the introduction of uncertainty in the method of
quantification, and the impact on federal funding. Courts may
address these concerns by retaining the current practicably irrigable
standard for quantification of the agricultural water right, and by
turning to experience gained in settlement processes to quantify
other aspects of a homeland water right. The effect of the standard
on the method for calculation offederalfunding to develop Indian
water highlights the need to change that method to reflect the
obligation to provide the water infrastructure necessary to render
a reservation a home.
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Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.'
The only job I ever quit at first sight involved hoeing beets.
A junior at Oregon State, I was broke and thus happy to have a job
at the Agricultural Experiment Station. Then my boss stopped his
pickup truck beside an unending field of beets. "Those will be
yours;" he said. "There's the hoe. You're after the pigweed." A
country boy, I knew pigweed at a glance.
Hefting the hoe while that good man dropped his pickup
into gear, I then said, "Wait." It was as close as I got to hoeing
beets. Ever since, I've never had a problem understanding that
farming is not necessarily an improvement on hunting and
gathering.
2
On November 26,2001, the Arizona Supreme Court introduced an
element of sanity and equity into the reserved water rights arena by
concluding that Indian reservations were actually established for the
purpose of providing a home for Indians.3 More startling than the ruling
itself is the fact that it took 93 years from the recognition of Indian reserved
water rights by the U.S. Supreme Court for a state court to reach this
conclusion.
In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the existence of implied
reserved water rights to fulfill the purpose of an Indian reservation."
Subsequent cases defined the purpose of most reservations as agricultural
and quantified the water right using an approach referred to as the
Practicably Irrigable Acreage (PIA) method.' The PIA method of
quantification allocates to tribes an amount of water necessary to irrigate all
land on the reservation that can feasibly and economically be irrigated.6 Its
application turns on the determination that the sole purpose in designating
a particular reservation was to create an agrarian lifestyle for its inhabitants.
The ruling by the Arizona Supreme Court rejects that narrow purpose and
proposes an alternative method of quantification.
The recognition of a homeland purpose is supported by a
principled application of the law prior to 1963 and the principles of
1. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
2. WILLIAM KITREDGE, THE NATURE OF GENEROSITY 83 (2000).
3. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68,74 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V).
4. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,576 (1908).
5. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (Arizona I); In Re Gen. Adjudication of
All Rights to Use of Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76,94 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I),
affd mere. sub. nom., 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
6. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 601; Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 94.
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statutory and treaty construction in the field of Indian law. More
importantly, the ruling by the Arizona Supreme Court eliminates not only
the legal gymnastics required to fit widely disparate reservations into an
agricultural model, but also the enormous inequity associated with doing
so. Whereas southern tribes located in alluvial valleys near a large surface
water source (e.g., the Colorado River) are entitled under an agricultural
purpose quantified by the PIA method to ample water,7 tribes in more
northern climes or mountainous terrain are left with insufficient rights to
meet basic drinking water needs.8 The Arizona homeland standard allows
quantification of tribal water rights based on a development plan tailored
to the current and future needs, geography, and culture of a particular
reservation, thus eliminating this inequity.
Nevertheless, there are concerns with wholesale adoption of the
Arizona standard. First, what of the reservations that benefit from the PIA
method and have relied on its stability? Any mid-course correction in law
must consider the effect of that correction on those who have invested
substantially in reliance on the existing guidelines. The use of a
development plan for quantification must still address the quantity of water
for the agricultural portion of the plan. Experience with, reliance on, and
precedent for the PIA method argue in favor of its continued use as one
method to evaluate the adequacy of the agricultural portion of a plan.
Second, what is the effect on funding for Indian water right settlements?
Currently the method used by the U.S. Department of the Interior to
recommend the level of funding is strongly influenced by the estimate of
the water right that would have been awarded in court.
Part I of this article addresses the roots of the PIA method. Part II
analyzes the new Arizona "homeland" standard from both a legal and an
equitable viewpoint and concludes that after leaving tribal water rights to
dangle in the wind (or the river) for 93 years, the mere fact that the last 38
of those years employed an artificial standard is no reason to avoid the
appropriate ruling now. Part III addresses concerns raised by the Arizona
standard. Concerns over implementation of the standard should be
addressed in how it is articulated, not by avoiding the logical conclusion
that a reservation is in fact a homeland. Concerns over its effect on funding
can only be addressed through a change in criteria for funding to also
reflect the need to develop reservations as homelands. Just as it is high time
the courts recognize the establishment of Indian reservations as permanent
homelands, it is high time the Department of the Interior revises its criteria
for settlement funding. This article suggests how.
7. See, e.g., Arizona 1, 373 U.S. at 546.
8. See, e.g., State ex rel Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235,247 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
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I. THE PIA METHOD AND HOW IT GREW
Understanding the importance of the Arizona ruling requires an
understanding of how courts came to attach an agricultural purpose to
reservations in the first place and how courts then defined a method of
quantification to fulfill that purpose. The reduction of Indian reservations
from vast territories to roughly their current configuration in the late 1800s
corresponded with the demise of the buffalo and the push to open land to
white settlement in the plains.9 With the loss of this traditional food source,
agriculture provided hope of a new source of subsistence."0 Furthermore,
the Christian overlay on federal Indian policy at the time held the view that
farming was the highest pursuit and that "civilization" of Indians would
come about through conversion of the hunter society to an agrarian one."
Against this backdrop, treaties, executive orders, and Congressional
documents reserving land for Indian reservations were littered with
language promising the tools and education necessary to farm." Tracing
how this history translated into a water right predominantly for agricultural
purposes begins with a discussion of the unique nature of reserved water
rights.
A. The Reserved Water Right and its Neighbor-Prior Appropriation
The general rule is that water allocation and management is left to
state law. 3 The doctrine of prior appropriation governs allocation of water
9. DAViD H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 143-44 (4th ed. 1998).
10. Id.
11. Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners (1869) and Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1869), reproduced in GETCHES, WILKINSON,& WILLIAMS, supra
note 9, at 149-51.
12. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (quoting from the Fort
Belknap Treaty of 1888, May 1,1888, 25 Stat. 124).
13. Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,155-58 (1935) (holding
that the effect of the 1866 Mining Act as amended in 1870, the 1877 Desert Lands Act, and the
1891 Act governing right-of-way for canals and reservoirs for public lands and reservations
was to sever the water right from the public land leaving it available for appropriation under
local law). See also United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 706 (1899) (stating
with respect to the same Acts that "the obvious purpose of Congress was to give its assent, so
far as the public lands were concerned, to any system although in contravention to the
common law rule [of riparian rights], which permitted the appropriation of those waters for
legitimate industries"); Cf. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955) (Pelton
Dam case) (holding that the same Acts do not apply to reserved land, only to public land
defined as land subject to private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws).
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in most western states.14 In practical terms, an appropriative right has
certain key attributes that become critical in times of drought. First, a water
right exists to the extent of application of water to a beneficial use.5 Second,
in times of shortage, allocation occurs on the basis of priority, i.e., the date
on which the water right was first developed. 6 The right of the earliest
appropriator on a stream is satisfied first. Junior appropriators take
remaining water. Shortage is not shared. In the West, water supply
fluctuates and there is rarely a year that could be identified as "average" in
rainfall. During periods of drought, those who came late to the basin often
are left with nothing.
Reserved water rights are the exception to the general rule that state
law controls the allocation and management of water. The doctrine of
implied reservation of waters was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Winters v. United States.17 The Court was faced with a conflict
between private irrigation diversions from the Milk River in Montana and
a downstream irrigation diversion to the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. 8
During drought, the water supply in the Milk River was inadequate to serve
both.9 Faced with a dry riverbed at the reservation headgate, the United
States filed suit to enjoin the diversion of water by private irrigators
upstream from the Fort Belknap Reservation.'
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, private diversions
developed before the tribal diversion would prevail.2' Nowhere in the 1888
Act establishing the Fort Belknap Reservation was water mentioned.' Yet
much of the Act focused on various means to provide the tribes with the
tools and knowledge to farm, and in the arid region of the Reservation
farming would be impossible without irrigation.2 In language suggesting
both that the Tribes retained previously held water rights24 and that the Act
14. I WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 226
(Harold H. Ellis & J. Peter DeBraal eds., 1971).
15. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-301(1) (2001).
16. See, e.g., id. at §§ 85-2-401, -406(I).
17. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
18. ld. at 570.
19. Id.
20. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1906), affd, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
21. JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL
AND LEGAL CONTEXT 1880S-1930S 35 (2000).
22. See Act of May 1, 1888,25 Stat. 113 (ratifying and confirming an agreement with the
Gros Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and River Crow Indians in Montana).
23. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,576 (1908).
24. Id. ("The lands were arid and, without irrigation, were practically valueless... .And
this, it is further contended, the Indians knew, and yet made no reservation of the waters.").
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of Congress established the water right,"5 the Court recognized that the
promises made in the Act could not be upheld without water. Thus, the
doctrine of implied water rights to fulfill a reservation purpose arose.
Federal law determines the scope of the reserved right.' Similar to
the establishment of the Fort Belknap Reservation, the actual reservation of
water is rarely stated in the documents reserving land. The right is thus
implied as sufficient water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation.28 It is this
lack of clarity in the definition of reserved water rights that has led to the
current dilemma over their quantification. Compare for example the
portions of legal abstracts defining the use of water under a private,
appropriative right to that of a reserved right:
1. Private water right:
Diversion rate: 5 cfs
Beneficial use: irrigation
Acreage irrigated: 1542 acres [specifically identified with legal
land description]
Period of use: March 15-August 20
2. Reserved water right:
Sufficient water to fulfill the purpose of an 1855 treaty [the
drafters of which never considered water].
Reserved water rights are potentially quite large and have the
ability to displace junior appropriative rights.29 Yet, no body of federal
statutory or common law clearly sets the standards for quantifying reserved
25. Id. at 577 ("The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from
appropriation under the state laws is not denied... .That the Government did reserve them we
have decided.") (citations omitted).
26. Id.
27. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128,145 (1976); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 813 (1976); United States v. Dist. Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971).
Although the principle is generally stated as dicta in the cited cases, substantial support exists
for the proposition that a federal right is defined by federal law. See, e.g., North Dakota v.
United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983) (federal law prevents draining of a federal waterfowl
easement under state law); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973)
(holding federal waterfowl easement purchases for refuge purposes are not defined by state
law).
28. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978); Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141;
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
29. See, e.g., Arizona 1, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (awarding almost one million acre-feet of
water to five reservations-roughly equivalent to 15 percent of the annual flow of the Colorado
River apportioned to California, Arizona, and Nevada combined).
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water rights.' As a result, observable beneficial use, the clear criteria for
quantification of appropriative rights affords greater protection on a
practical daily basis than the vague standard of "purpose" defining
reserved rights. A quantified and developed right is more readily enforced
and protected because its measure and application are visible to all. In
addition, a quantified and developed right provides clear notice to
newcomers to a water source of the likelihood that junior rights will be
satisfied. Thus, the search began for an applicable method to quantify tribal
water rights to provide certainty to their neighbors and protect the rights
of tribes.
B. The Practicably Irrigable Acreage Method
In 1963, after determining that five reservations in the Lower
Colorado River Basin were established for agricultural purposes, the U.S.
Supreme Court endorsed a method used to quantify the water rights for
that purpose: the Practicably Irrigable Acreage method, or PIA.3" PIA is a
quantification method that gives tribes a right to the amount of water
necessary to irrigate all land on the reservation that can feasibly and
economically be irrigated.32 Application of the method to the five
reservations involved in Arizona v. California resulted in an award of just
under one million acre-feet per year.33 The average annual flow of the
Colorado River is approximately 14 million acre-feet.3
30. See, e.g., In re the Adjudication of Existing and Reserved Rights to Use of Water, Cause
No. WC-92-1, slip op. at 12-13 (Mont. Water Ct. Aug. 10, 2001), 12-13, 16 (Fort Peck Decree)..
After nearly one hundred years of legislation, litigation, and policy-making,
there are still no bright lines clearly and consistently delineating the
[Reserved Water Rights] Doctrine. Most of the legal issues inherent in the
Doctrine remain unsettled and hotly debated and are now complicated by
decades of distrust and competing policies... .[There is no clear consensus
among the federal courts as to how the "purpose" of the reservation is to be
determined, the proper quantification standard to apply, or the method for
quantifying the rights based on that standard.
Id. at 13-16.
31. Arizona 1, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
32. Id. at 600 (accepting the conclusion of the Special Master that quantification of the
water necessary to irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage on the Reservation is an
appropriate method to determine the water necessary for present and future needs. The
relevant discussion of PIA occurs in the Report of the Special Master to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Dec. 5, 1960.); see also Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979) (Arizona II) (further
defining the water rights of the five tribes).
33. Arizona 1, 373 U.S. at 596.
34. Monique C. Shay, Promises of a Viable Homeland, Realit.ofSelectiue Reclamation: A Stud1
of the Relationship Between the Winters Doctrine and Federal Water Development in the Western
United States, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 547,578 (1992).
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With an indication of the magnitude of the cloud on appropriative
water rights, states pursued jurisdiction to adjudicate tribal water rights. In
a highly contentious process that included a last minute appropriation rider
referred to as the McCarran Amendment" waiving the sovereign immunity
of the United States35 and appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting
the McCarran Amendment,' state courts achieved jurisdiction over
adjudication of tribal water rights. This highly politicized process led to the
startling outcome that state rather than federal courts define Indian
reserved water rights in the first instance, opening the door to substantial
experimentation in their quantification. Surprisingly, until now that
experimentation has never materialized. State adjudication of tribal water
rights addresses federal questions, thus state court decisions remain subject
to U.S. Supreme Court review.37 To avoid potential Supreme Court reversal
by embarking on an untested path, most states and tribes proceed within
the guidelines provided by PIA-i.e., quantification of water based on the
agricultural potential of the reservation land base-even though the
Supreme Court has never articulated PIA as the only method for
quantification.
35. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994). The relevant text of the McCarran Amendment states,
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or
(2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when
a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to
plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction.
36. Development of the interpretation of the McCarran Amendment in chronological
order: United States v. Dist. Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971) (holding that the
waiver of sovereign immunity in the McCarran Amendment covers suits to adjudicate
reserved water rights); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976) (holding that although jurisdiction is not exclusive in state court, the policy apparent
in'the McCarran Amendment, to avoid piecemeal litigation, favors deference to state
adjudication); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) (holding that dismissal
of federal suits to quantify Indian reserved water rights in deference to state adjudication is
appropriate).
37. See, e.g., Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (affirming In Re Gen.
Adjudication of All Rights to Use of Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988)
(Big Horn )).
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Endorsement of the PIA method has led to considerable debate
over what composes acreage that is practicably irrigable.' Because
quantification of most tribal water rights has been the subject of settlement
rather than litigation, it is necessary to turn to the one state case where the
elements of PIA have been litigated: the adjudication in Wyoming state
court of the water rights of the Arapaho and Shoshone Tribes of the Wind
River Reservation (Big Horn I). In Big Horn I, the State, Tribes, and United
States stipulated to the following definition of PIA: "those acres susceptible
to sustained irrigation at reasonable costs. " The Wyoming Supreme Court
accepted the application of this test by the Special Master who required the
following analyses:
(1) classification of lands based on arability of soils;
(2) analysis of the engineering feasibility of providing
irrigation to those soils classified as arable; and
(3) analysis of the economic feasibility of irrigation on
the lands considered arable and techically amenable
to irrigation.
40
Each of these steps requires determinations that can result in a wide degree
of variability in the PIA ultimately calculated. The area of greatest debate
is the economic feasibility analysis, because small differences in factors can
result in wide variability in the outcome.41 Private water users and states
point to these factors when they criticize PIA for awarding huge water
rights without considering the effects on other water users.42
38. See Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 76; see also Martha C. Franks, The Use of the Practicably
Irrigable Acreage Standard in the Quantification of Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURcESJ. 549
(1991); Gina McGovern, Settlement or Adjudication Resolving Indian Reserved Rights, 36 ARIz. L.
REv. 195, 205-08 (1994); Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft
Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv, 683 (1997).
39. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 101.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 103-04 (noting expert testimony on discount rate variations from two percent to
11 percent); see also Lynnette Boomgaarden, Practicably Irrigable Acreage Under Fire: The Search
for a Better Legal Standard, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 417,430 (1990) (noting that small changes
in variables, particularly the discount rate, have large effects on PIA); H.S. Burness, et al., The
"New" Arizona v. California: Practicably Irrigable Acreage and Economic Feasibility, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 517, 522 (1982); Franks, supra note 38, at 562 (noting the considerable guesswork
in the economic feasibility analysis); Shay, supra note 34, at 578 (asserting that the cost/benefit
analysis in application of the PIA standard is highly subjective and can be an expensive battle
of experts).
42. Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers, 30
TULSA L.J. 61, 75 (1994); Elizabeth Weldon, Practicably Irrigable Acreage Standard: A Poor Partner
for the West's Water Future, 25 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 203, 205 (2000).
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While states and private water users debate the technical aspects of
the economic feasibility analysis, tribes debate whether its application is
appropriate at all. Passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902 began the use of
federal subsidies to facilitate settlement of the West.' This federal policy led
to substantial non-Indian irrigation development in basins shared with
Indian reservations. Many argue that the economic feasibility analysis
under the PIA standard holds quantification of tribal water to a higher
standard than federal Reclamation projects." The unfairness of this is
particularly acute where tribal water resources are shared with a
Reclamation project. Given the dissatisfaction on both sides of the debate,
it is not surprising that parties to adjudication of tribal water rights sought
change.
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on Big Horn I on
the question, "In the absence of any demonstrated necessity for additional
water to fulfill Reservation purposes and in the presence of substantial state
water rights long in use on the Reservation, may a reserved water right be
implied for all practicably irrigable land within a Reservation?"" The Court
43. Regarding the size of the subsidy, see DANIEL McCooL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS:
IRON TRIANGLES, FEDERAL WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER 71 (1987) (noting an
investment of $3.62 billion in Reclamation by 1974, resulting in a 57-97 percent subsidy
according to a 1980 study by the Interior Department's Office of Policy Analysis). Regarding
the policy behind the Reclamation Act, see MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN
WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 4, 120-24 (1987) (summarizing the many bailouts of
Reclamation projects through restructuring of repayment and extension of the repayment
period required on the federal capitol investments in reclamation, Reisner states, "Were it not
for a century and a half of messianic effort toward [manipulation of water], the West as we
know it would not exist."); see also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 292
(1958) (holding that Congress intended the Reclamation program to benefit "the largest
number of people, consistent, of course, with the public good"); Peterson v. United States Dep't
of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1990) ("With the Reclamation Act, Congress
created a blueprint for the orderly development of the West, and water was the instrument by
which the plan would be carried out..."); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d
1093,1119 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that the Act had the following goals: "to create family-sized
farms in areas irrigated by federal projects.. .to secure the wide distribution of the substantial
subsidy involved in reclamation projects and limit private speculative gains resulting from the
existence of such projects").
44. Franks, supra note 38, at 578 (noting that a strict application of a PIA economic analysis
would not show any modem federal water project to be feasible); Walter Rusinek, A Preview
of Coming Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and the Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 ECOLOGY
LQ. 355,372 (1990) (criticizing the application of PIA in Arizona II for imposing more stringent
standards than those required for federal reclamation projects); Shay, supra note 34, at 579
(noting that Tribes argue that the economic feasibility analysis under PIA is more stringent
than the requirements for federal reclamation projects).
45. Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989) (granting certiorari on "Question 2
presented by the petition"). Text of the question may be found at Rusinek, supra note 44, at 394
n.267.
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issued the following ruling: "The judgment below is affirmed by an equally
divided Court."46
With PIA reaffirmed, courts and parties proceeded to settle under
the guidelines imposed by the PIA standard despite the fact that it resulted
in a less than satisfactory outcome in the vast majority of cases.47 Those
affected by water allocation were thus startled to'learn that an even more
subjective standard might have prevailed. Upon. the opening of the papers
of Justice Thurgood Marshall, parties learned that prior to her recusal from
Big Horn I due to the conflict created by a family ranch with water claims in
the Gila River adjudication, Justice O'Connor had written a majority
opinion that would have altered the PIA standard.' Justice O'Connor
would have required "sensitivity" to private development and reduced a
PIA award if the projects proposed'lacked a "reasonable likelihood" of
being built.' Thus, a standard already highly variable in its application
would have included the subjective requirement that the political will to
develop irrigation on that particular reservation exists. Quite possibly that
political will would decrease with the increasing level of water
development in basins shared with a reservation. Lucky the tribe who
ended up with flat land in a warm climate where its trustee did not promote
irrigation of surrounding land through development of a Reclamation
project. The dispute within the Supreme Court made public by the release
of the Marshall papers, combined with growing concern over inequitable
results, rendered the issue of the standard for quantification of tribal water
rights ripe for change.
II. THE HOMELAND STANDARD
On November 26, 2001, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected
agriculture as the standard purpose and PIA as the sole measure of
agricultural reserved water rights on Indian reservations in Arizona,
46. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
47. It should be noted that nothing in either Arizona I and II or Wyoming v. United States
requires PIA as the only standard for quantification of a reserved water right. These cases
merely endorse the method as a reasonable accommodation of the need to quantify future
rights when the purpose of the reservation has been determined to be agricultural.
Nevertheless, seeking to avoid a costly process of trial and error to determine what other
standard the Supreme Court might accept, states and tribes have relied on the validity of PIA.
48. Second Draft Opinion of O'Connor, J., at 17-18, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S.
406 (1989) (No. 88-309) (available in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, papers
of Justice Marshall); see also Mergen and Liu, supra note 38, at 684.
49. Second Draft Opinion of O'Connor, J., at 17, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406




concluding that a homeland rather than an agricultural purpose applies.'
The concept of a Reservation as a homeland is not new. " However, the
Arizona Supreme Court is the first state court to squarely adopt a homeland
standard and to further articulate a method of quantification consistent with
that standard.
The Arizona Supreme Court ruling arose in the context of the water
rights of the Gila River Indian Community. Quantification of those water
rights is in active negotiation52 The Gila River is Arizona's largest tributary
to the Colorado River, and the claims of the Gila River Indian Community
are the largest on the river.' The 1.5 million acre-feet claim of the Gila River
Indian Community represents the entire annual flow of the river from the
main stem and tributaries upstream from the Reservation.54 The Arizona
Supreme Court has closely defined the scope of that negotiation with
respect to the quantification of the water rights. On May 16, 1991, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that a court may not approve an Indian water
rights settlement unless it is convinced "by a preponderance of the evidence
that [I there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the water rights of the
Indian tribe.. .established in the settlement agreement.. .are no more
extensive than the Indian tribe.. .would have been able to prove at trial."'
Thus, despite the fact that the Tribes' water rights are in negotiation, the
parties must reach a settlement that results in a tribal water right that is less
than or equal to the right the Gila River Indian Community would have
50. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. and Source,
35 P.3d 68,76 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V).
51. Tribes have long asserted a homeland purpose in quantification of water rights. Courts
have either rejected the approach, see In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use of Water in
the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 94-97 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I), affd mem. sub. nom., 492
U.S. 406 (1989) (rejecting the finding of the Special Master that treaty language stating "[tihe
Indian herein named agree...they will make said reservations their permanent home"
indicated that a primary purpose of the Reservation was to provide a permanent homeland),
or relied on quantification for irrigation to provide sufficient water to account for future needs
implicit in a homeland purpose. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,47-48 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that "one purpose for creating this reservation was to provide a homeland
for the Indians to maintain their agrarian society" and then concluding that the amount of
water necessary to irrigate all practicably irrigable acreage is the appropriate measure of water
for that purpose).
52. S. Joshua Newcom, Peace on the Gila? Pending Gila River Indian Community Settlement




55. Special Procedural Order Providing for the Approval of Fed. Water Rights
Settlements, Including Those of Indian Tribes (May 16, 1991) at 7, In re Gen. Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V),
available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/wm/DecisionsandOrders.htm.
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obtained in litigation.-5 As a result, negotiations benefit from an
understanding among the parties of the standard under which a court
would quantify the tribal water rights.
The question of quantification, addressed in the November 26,2001,
ruling, came before the Arizona Supreme Court during the settlement
process because of the court's role in the interlocutory review." At issue in
the November 26,2001, ruling was, "What is the appropriate standard to be
applied in determining the amount of water reserved for federal lands."'
The trial court had concluded that the purpose of the reservation is
agricultural and the appropriate standard is PIA." The Arizona Supreme
Court rejected both the purpose and the measure defined by the lower
court, concluding that
1. The purpose of any reservation is to establish a
"homeland "60 and
2. The measure of the water right for a "homeland" is
specific to the needs, wants, plans, cultural background,
and geographic setting of the particular reservation, and
cannot be defined by a single measure such as PIA.
61
A. Analysis of the Arizona Supreme Court's "Homeland" Purpose
The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in the Gila River
adjudication represents a principled determination that an Indian
reservation is established for a homeland purpose. First, the court
distinguishes Indian reservations from other federal reservations on the
basis of the canons of construction requiring liberal interpretation of
treaties, statutes, and executive orders pertaining to Indian affairs and the
56. Compare In Re the Adjudication of Existing and Reserved Rights to the Use of Water,
Both Surface and Underground, of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation Within the State of Montana in Basins 40E, 40EJ, 400, 40Q, 40R, & 405, No. WC-92-
1, 7-8 (Mont. Water Ct. 2001) (concluding that, if there is no material injury to other water
rights, the standard of review of an Indian water rights settlement in Montana is that the
settlement be "fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable and conforms to applicable law").
57. See Special Procedural Order Providing for Interlocutory Appeals and Certifications
(Sept. 26, 1989), In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V) (Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3, and W-4), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/wm/nterlocutoryAppeals.htm (addressing the court's role
in the interlocutory review).
58. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68,71 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id. at 79-80.
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federal fiduciary relationship with tribes.62 Second, the court interprets
Winters and Arizona I to be consistent with a determination that the purpose
of the establishment of an Indian reservation is to provide a permanent
homeland.' Third, the court points out that the traditional test for
identifying the purpose of implied reserved water rights for federal
reservations, which involves examination of historic documents associated
with establishment of a reservation, is inadequate when applied to Indian
reservations." Historic documents illustrate more than a century of
conflicting federal policy and multiple efforts to reduce Indian lands for the
purpose of opening areas for non-Indian settlement, and revealing little
about the intended use of land dedicated to reservation status.' Under the
Arizona Court's ruling, this traditional examination of the specific history
and documents associated with a particular Indian reservation is left to the
quantification stage of that particular reservation's water rights, not the
determination of purpose. Each step in the court's analysis will be discussed
in turn.
1. The Difference Between Indian and Other Federal Reservations
With the exception of the brief endorsement of the Wind River
water right, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the doctrine of reserved
water rights since 1963 only in the context of non-Indian federal
reservations." In doing so, the Court has articulated a very narrow
construction of the scope of the implied right, raising the issue of whether
the same narrow construction applies to Indian reserved rights.67
In United States v. New Mexico, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
the reserved water rights of the Gila National Forest and announced a
distinction between primary and secondary purposes of a reservation.' The
Court noted that for every gallon of water awarded to the federal
62. Id. at 74, 76.
63. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68,74,78 (Ariz. 2001) (Gia V).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (affirming an injunction against
private groundwater pumping affecting water levels at an underground pool within a national
monument); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (addressing the scope of the
reserved water right associated with a national forest).
67. MERGEN AND LU, supra note 38, at 697, 706-07 (noting dispute over whether the
Sensitivity Doctrine from New Mexico and Cappaert applies to Indian reserved water rights);
ROYSThR, supra note 42, at 72 (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court has not applied [the
primary/secondary distinction of New Mexico] to Indian water rights"); RUSINEK, supra note
44, at 373.
68. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701-02.
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government, one less gallon is available for appropriation under state law.'
Thus, out of traditional deference to state law concerning allocation of water
resources, the Court concluded that only primary purposes carry a reserved
water right.' Water for secondary purposes can be fulfilled pursuant to
state law.
71
The Court further narrowed the scope of federal reserved water
rights in addressing the rights associated with an underground pool
expressly preserved in the establishment of a national monument. 2 The
Court was unwilling to balance competing appropriative water interests
against those of the federal land out of concern that congressional intent
with respect to the use of federal land could be defeated.' However, once
again, out of sensitivity to the traditional deference to state law, the Court
stated, "The implied-reservation-of-rights-doctrine.. .reserves only that
amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no
more."74
The Arizona Supreme Court appropriately rejected application of
this narrow construction to the rights of Indian reservations. The court
relied on three factors to distinguish the liberal construction required for
analysis of the rights of Indian Reservations from the narrow construction
of those associated with non-Indian federal reservations. First, the court
refers to the special fiduciary relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes.' Second, related to the fiduciary relationship, the court
refers to the canon of construction that "treaties, statutes and executive
orders are construed liberally in the Indians' favor."76 Third, the court
69. Id. at 705. It should be noted that despite the influence of the concept of a gallon-for-
gallon tradeoff on the reasoning of the Court, there is little actual data to support this assertion.
Even on a stream considered fully appropriated, differences in timing of diversion use of
storage and return flow render calculation of the tradeoff more complex.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 132 (1976).
73. Id. at 138-39.
74. Id. at 141. The term "sensitivity" was applied to this issue by the dissenting opinion
in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 718, in which Justice Powell states, "I agree with the
Court that the implied-reservation doctrine should be applied with sensitivity to its impact
upon those who have obtained water rights under state law and to Congress' general policy
of deference to state water law." Although the majority opinion does not use the term
"sensitivity," it is considered the source of the Sensitivity Doctrine.
75. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35




rejects the narrow construction as inadequate to meet the goal of Indian
self-sufficiency.'
a. Fiduciary Relationship
Indian reservations are distinguished from federal reservations by
the special relationship between tribes and the U.S. government. This
special relationship in which the United States is considered the trustee for
tribal nations "is one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law."T It is an
outgrowth of the duty accepted by the federal government when it asserted
dominantce over Indian tribes.79 Trusteeship governs "the required standard
of conduct for federal officials and Congress.. .[and the interpretation of]
treaties, agreements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative
regulations."' A significant factor in the rise of the doctrine of trusteeship
was the need for the federal government to intervene between states and
tribes in order to protect the tribes.8 In the face of this historic duty, it
would be incongruous to construe tribal water rights narrowly out of
deference to state law.
b. Canons of Construction
In addition, at the time of reservation establishment, tribal
governments were generally weakened and faced with annihilation or
agreement to peace on terms expressed in the English language of the
federal government. To address this unequal bargaining power and to fulfill
the obligation of the trustee to deal fairly with the Indians, the U.S. Supreme
Court relies on certain canons of construction when interpreting treaties,
statutes, and Executive Orders pertaining to Indian affairs.82 Thus, in
77. Id. at 77 ("While the purpose for which the federal government reserves other types
of lands may be strictly construed, the purposes of Indian reservations are necessarily entitled
to broader interpretation if the goal of Indian self-sufficiency is to be attained.").
78. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (1982 ed.).
79. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Although the case merely
concluded that the Supreme Court lacked original jurisdiction in a suit brought by a tribe
against a state, Justice Marshall's dicta that tribes may "be denominated domestic dependent
nations" and that "[tiheir relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian" is considered the source of the trustee doctrine.).
80. COHEN, supra note 78, at 220.
81. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,561-62 (1832) (holding that "the laws of
Georgia can have no force" within the boundaries of the reservation).
82. The canons of construction, first applied to treaties and later extended to statutes,
executive orders, and administrative regulations, are "11) that treaties be liberally construed
to favor Indians; [2) that ambiguous expressions in treaties must be resolved in favor of the
Indians; and [3] that treaties should be construed as the Indians would have understood them."
COHEN, supra note 78, at 222. See also McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 174
(1973) (ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned);
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970) ("treaties with the Indians must be
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Winters v. United States, the Court, faced with the dilemma of reconciling the
intent of Congress in establishing the Fort Belknap Reservation with the
conflicting intent of Congress in opening adjacent land to settlement, ruled
that the canons of construction weigh in favor of tribes.'3 The Court
concluded, in light of scarce water supply, that the water is reserved for the
reservation.' No such principle in favor of a broad construction of
reserving documents exists for national forests or monuments. 5
c. Indian Self-Sufficiency
Finally, an Indian reservation is not a mere set-aside of public lands
for a specific national purpose.' Meeting the goal of Indian self-sufficiency
requires a broad reading of the purposes of an Indian reservation." In
contrast to a national forest that is set aside to protect certain resource
values,'s people live on Indian reservations. Preserving the ability of those
people to determine their own future is not so singular as the primary
purpose approach requires. Furthermore, this goal of self-sufficiency
through establishment of a homeland is consistent with prior case law.
2. The Law Leading up to the Homeland Standard
In arriving at the homeland standard, the Arizona Supreme Court
notes that the establishment of reservations as permanent homes formed the
interpreted as they would have understood them"); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
423,431-32 (1943) (Indian treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.); Charles
F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water
Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601,617 (1975).
83. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
84. Id. at 576-77.
85. MERGEN AND Liu, supra note 38, at 713.
86. Franks, supra note 38, at 555-56 (contrasting the minimal needs tests of New Mexico and
Cappaert with the maximization of the water right found by applying PIA); Shay, supra note 34,
at 575 (stating that "the purposes of Indian reservations cannot be clearly limited as they can
be for a reservation like a National Forest"). But see Rebecca E. Wardlaw, The Irrigable Acres
Doctrine, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 375-76 (1975) The language in Winters can be interpreted
as recognizing either a reservation of rights by the Indians or a reservation by the federal
government and those who support the theory that Winters is based on a reservation of rights
by the federal government "apparently do not materially distinguish the situation of an Indian
reservation from that of other federal reservations." Id. at 376.
87. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68, 77 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V), citing WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, 245-46
(1981). It should be noted that later in the opinion, the Arizona court states that "[tihe PIA
standard also potentially frustrates the requirement that federally reserved water rights be
tailored to minimal need." Gila V, 35 P.3d at 79. This falls in the section of the case discussing
the application of the homeland standard. The contradiction between the court's broad reading
of purpose and the narrow application of quantification is discussed below.
88. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,707 (1978) (explaining that Congress
set aside national forests to conserve water flows and provide a reliable timber source).
Fall 2002]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
basis for the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in both Winters and Arizona IP'
The Arizona homeland standard is consistent with both Winters and Arizona
1, despite the articulation of PIA in the latter case, and represents a more
principled development of the law that began with Winters.
Winters laid the groundwork for both the homeland standard and
the erroneous interpretation that agriculture is the sole purpose of Indian
reservations." To arrive at the conclusion that the Reservation held the
superior right, the Court spoke broadly, stating that "[t]he Indians had
command of the lands and the waters-command of all their beneficial use,
whether kept for hunting, 'and grazing roving herds of stock,' or turned to
agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this?"91 The
Court appropriately relied on the canons of construction for the proposition
that treaties with Indian tribes must be construed liberally.92
But, it so happened that the particular tribal diversion in question
in Winters was for the purpose of irrigation. Thus, the Court specifically
addressed this issue. It pointed to the specific language in the treaty stating,
The reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which
the Indians had the right to occupy and use, and which was
adequate for the habits and wants of a nomadic and
uncivilized people. It was the policy of the government, it
was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and to
become a pastoral and civilized people."93
Never mind that the Court also noted the treaty language stating
that the land was reserved "as an Indian reservation and for a permanent
home and abiding place of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine bands or tribes
of Indians,"" the pastoral stage was set.
Fifty years passed in which only occasional examples exist of the
efforts of the United States to protect the irrigation water of tribes95 until
89. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 74 (noting that Winters recognized the Fort Belknap Reservation as
a "permanent home and abiding place," Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,565 (1908), and
that Arizona I referred to the same concept as "a 'livable' environment." Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546,599 (1963) (Arizona 1).
90. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
91. Id. at 576.
92. Id.; see supra note 82; see also Royster, supra note 42, at 65 (noting that the Court relied
on the canons of construction to liberally construe the purpose for the establishment of the Fort
Belknap Reservation in Winters).
93. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
94. Id. at 565.
95. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957) (establishing rights of the Yakima tribe in Ahtanum Creek and
concluding that the 1855 treaty reserved water for present and future needs); United States v.
Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939) (restraining upstream diversions
from interfering with reserved water rights of the tribe); United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co.,
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Arizona sued California for apportionment of the Lower Basin share of the
Colorado River and the United States intervened asserting the reserved
water rights in the basin, in particular those necessary to fulfill the
agricultural purpose of five Indian reservations."' With little discussion of
the agricultural purpose, the case focused on a method of quantification to
fulfill that purpose. In formulating the PIA method, the Special Master
articulated a land-based approach that appeared more objective and more
certain than a method based on population growth. The U.S. Supreme
Court accepted this approach and rejected the argument put forth by
Arizona "that the quantity of water reserved should be measured by the
Indians' 'reasonably foreseeable needs.'"'97 The state's proposed method was
based on population projections, which, the Court concluded, "can only be
guessed."
98
Apparent in the Court's discussion in Arizona I is the struggle to
find a method to quantify a water right not yet exercised in a manner that
would fill the needs of the tribes for all times and yet provide certainty for
off-Reservation water users. The rejection of the reasonable needs standard
was not based on a determination that agriculture trumped all other uses,
but on a concern that projections of population and need beyond the
immediate future were too uncertain.' The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed
the PIA standard, stating "that the only feasible and fair way by which
reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage. " "
Nowhere did the Court articulate a conclusion that PIA was the only
possible method for all reservations or that agriculture was the sole purpose
for which any and all reservations were established.' However, implied in
this search for a method that would withstand the test of time is recognition
that the reservation is a permanent homeland.
3. The Difficulty in Gleaning Congressional Intent
In the search for reservation purpose, courts turn to "the document
and circumstances surrounding its creation, and the history of the Indians
Equity No. A3 (D. Nev. 1944) (decree of water rights including those asserted by the United
States on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe); United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, 27 F.2d
909, 910 (D. Idaho 1928) (seeking to determine rights of Indians for water for irrigation and
domestic use).
96. See generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Arizona I).
97. Id. at 600.
98. Id. at 601.
99. Id. at 600-01.
100. Id. at 601.
101. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68, 78 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V) (stating, "As observed by Special Master Tuttle in his Arizona
II report, 'the Court did not necessarily adopt this standard as the universal measure of Indian
reserved water rights...'") (citation omitted).
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for whom it was created.""°2 Rejecting this approach, the Arizona Supreme
Court points out that the search for reservation purpose within the
historical documents establishing any one Indian reservation will reveal
conflicting purposes both in the documents themselves and within federal
policy.1
03
A clear example of the problem created by reliance on establishing
documents exists for the Rocky Boy's Reservation in Montana. Land
originally set aside for the Rocky Boy's Reservation in Montana in 1916 was
not identified as suitable for agriculture when included in a survey to
identify agricultural land."° In 1938, this deficiency was recognized and
35,500 acres, some of it identified as marginal agricultural land, was
purchased by the United States for addition to the Rocky Boy's
Reservation."rs Did the purpose of the Rocky Boy's Reservation suddenly
change in 1938? What does that mean for small acreages that, despite the
Secretary's survey, are irrigable within the original Reservation?"° In short,
which is more important: what the federal government considered the
possibilities for use of that land over 80 years ago, or what the Tribes can
make of it now?
The Gila River Indian Community experienced a similar ambiguous
history. As noted by the Arizona Supreme Court, "the boundaries of the
Gila River Indian Community changed ten times from its creation in 1859
until 1915. "107 The court notes that the different purposes associated with
the additions and deletions of land asserted by state litigants would result
in "[sluch an arbitrary patchwork of water rights [as tobe] unworkable and
inconsistent with the concept of a permanent, unified homeland.""8
The Arizona Supreme Court notes that parallel to the conflicting
language of documents associated with specific Indian reservations is the
102. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,47 (9th Cir. 1981).
103. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 74-75.
104. General Orders and Circulars, No. 85, Headquarters of the Army, October 22, 1981;
see also An Act Authorizing Secretary of the Interior to Survey Lands of the Abandoned Fort
Assiniboine Military Reservation, ch. 25,38 Stat. 807 (1915) (directing the Secretary to survey
lands on the former military reservation suitable for agriculture, coal mining, and timer.). The
Rocky Boy's Reservation was established out of a portion of the former military reservation;
however, the Rocky Boy's Reservation included none of the land identified by the survey as
suitable for agriculture.
105. S. REP. No. 76-105, at 1-2 (1939). The area was not actually added to the Reservation
until November 26, 1947.
106. See also Franks, supra note 38, at 562 (asserting that congressional intent varies for
reservations and PIA is merely an expedient due to the difficulty and possible irrelevance of
determining congressional intent).
107. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68,74 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V).
108. Id.
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conflict between federal Indian policy and federal policy to settle the West
in general."° As reservations were reduced in size, the Bureau of
Reclamation developed irrigation projects for their off-reservation
neighbors.' Thus, the policy of moving Indians out of the way for white
settlement1" ran headlong into the agricultural purpose assigned to
reservations such as the five examined in Arizona I. The Arizona Supreme
Court's ruling avoids the need to interpret conflicting documents and
shifting federal policy associated with specific periods in U.S. history by
taking a broad view of reservation purpose as what it should be if the
United States is to keep its word and provide a permanent home for
Indians.
B. The Measure of the Homeland Standard
The question remains: If a homeland rather than agricultural
purpose is applied, what is the measure of the water right for a homeland?
The ruling by the Arizona Supreme Court that Indian reservations are
created for the purpose of providing a homeland allows Arizona courts to
quantify water for uses other than agriculture. It does not eliminate the
need to determine what those uses might be and how to quantify them. The
difficulty this presents has led some federal courts to adhere to the PIA
method for quantification despite the determination that a homeland
purpose applies.
12
The Arizona court rejects PIA as the sole measure of the water
rights for a homeland purpose. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Arizona
Supreme Court raises certain policy concerns associated with application
of PIA. First, the court raises one of the primary failings of the PIA
standard-the constraints on economic progress and self-determination
imposed by assuming a single economic "choice" for tribes: agriculture" 4-
and notes that PIA imposes a method based on an economic pursuit that is
no longer considered viable in many parts of the west. 5 Second, the court
109. Id. at 75.
110. Compare MCCOOL, supra note 43 (addressing funding for BOR irrigation development)
and McCOOL, supra note 43, at 125 (addressing funding for BIA irrigation development); see
also Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 566 (1908) (addressing the conflict between the
intent of the federal government in establishing the reservation and its intent in opening the
surrounding area to settlement).
111. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 75.
112. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,47 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68,78 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V).
114. Id. at 76.
115. Id. at 78-79.
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notes the potential "for inequitable treatment of tribes based solely on
geographic location" through application of PIA." 6
1. The Rejection of a Single (un)Economic Path for Indian Reservations
The Arizona Supreme Court rejects the PIA measure of tribal water
rights because it implies that an Indian reservation will remain static,
relying on agriculture even when it has been found no longer to serve the
economies of the surrounding region. 17 The court may be criticized for
failing to make the distinction between the purpose for which the right is
quantified and the use to which the water is put."' However, both the
requirement under the PIA method of economic feasibility under conditions
at the time of quantification and the difficulty tribes have faced in
attempting to apply water to uses other than irrigation once quantified
render that distinction illusory and justify the approach of the Arizona
court.
For acreage to be considered practicably irrigable, it must be
economically feasible to irrigate under conditions existing at the time of
adjudication."9 This means that the economic benefits of developing
irrigation must equal or outweigh the costs today.20 Even under conditions
existing in the early 1900s, the costs of irrigating the arid West have often
exceeded the benefits.'2' This gap between benefit and cost has grown only
more pronounced as the cost of development of infrastructure and
environmental compliance has grown. As the Arizona court points out,
"Although over 40 percent of the nation's population lived and worked on
farms in 1880, less than 5 percent do today."" It is highly likely that if the
surrounding region has switched from agriculture to other economic
pursuits, it is because agriculture is no longer even marginally economically
116. Id.
117. Id. at 76, 78-79.
118. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419,422 (1979) (Arizona I/) ("The foregoing reference
to a quantity of water necessary to supply consumptive use required for irrigation.. .shall
constitute the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water rights, but shall not
constitute a restriction of the usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural application. If all
or part of the adjudicated water rights of any of the five Indian Reservations is used other than
for irrigation or other agricultural application, the total consumptive use ...shall not exceed the
consumptive use that would have resulted if the diversions.. .had been used for irrigation.").
119. In Re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use of Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753
P.2d 76, 101 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I), affd mem. sub. nora., 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
120. Shay, supra note.34, at 578.
121. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68,78 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V), citing Franks, supra note 38, at 578; see also MCCOOL, supra note
43, at 71; REISNER, supra note 43, at 5, 120-24.
122. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 76, citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICALSTATISTICSOPTHE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970,240,457 (1975).
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feasible."2 Thus, PIA has become obsolete with the changing economic base
of the West.
124
Even if quantification under PIA is accomplished, the identification
of a sole agricultural purpose becomes a barrier to pursuit of other
economic uses of water by tribes. The distinction between quantification
and use is one without a difference when tribes encounter insurmountable
obstacles to application of water quantified for irrigation to other uses.
These obstacles arise in the course of determining on what basis Indian
water rights may be put to different uses and, in the first instance, who
decides.
Interpretation of the McCarran Amendment to allow state court
adjudication of water rights left open the question of administration of
those rights once adjudicated. 2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a tribe has
jurisdiction over administration, including change in use of its water rights
when the water source is located wholly within a reservation.26 However,
the Ninth Circuit has also recognized state jurisdiction over non-Indian
water use on a reservation when the water source is shared with land off
the reservation.'27 The Wyoming Supreme Court took the constraints on
tribal administration one step further. In response to a challenge to tribal
dedication of a portion of the water rights of the Wind River Reservation to
instream flow, the court concluded that the change could only occur
pursuant to state law.'28 The Justices differed in their bases for the
determination. One basis, that only the state can hold an instream flow right
under Wyoming law, presents an absolute bar.'" Even without the
restriction on ownership of an instream flow right, Wyoming state law
permits change in use of a water right only if the applicant can prove the
change can occur without injury to other water users. 3 When a water right
quantified for irrigation has never been developed for that purpose, the
burden of proving no injury as a result of the change is nearly
insurmountable. Yet, if agriculture is no longer an economic pursuit on the
123. Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust
Responsibility, 27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1992) (noting the incongruence between the
shift of Reclamation water to urban uses and the argument that the tribal use should be
agricultural).
124. Royster, supra note 42, at 75 (noting that PIA has been criticized for locking tribes into
a nineteenth century notion when agriculture is no longer economically feasible).
125. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
126. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
127. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984).
128. In ReGen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d
273, 279 (Wyo. 1992) (Big Horn ii).
129. Id., citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-1002(e) (Michie Supp. 1991).
130. Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 280.
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Reservation, the water will never be developed to provide a baseline from
which change can occur.
Given the barriers to change in use of a tribal water right quantified
for an agricultural purpose, the Arizona court was correct in saying, "Just
as the nation's economy has evolved, nothing should prevent tribes from
diversifying their economies if they so choose and are reasonably able to do
so. The permanent homeland concept allows for this flexibility and
practicality.
" 13
2. Elimination of the Inequities of PIA
Although the PIA method has long been criticized by non-Indian
water users as awarding too much water, widespread recognition of the
inadequacy of the standard might not have occurred had adjudication of
reserved rights not run-up against the inevitable-reservations where PIA
granted so little water as to make a mockery of any promise to provide
conditions for permanent settlement on a reservation." This is particularly
apparent for tribes on mountainous reservations or in northern climates.33
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized "the inequitable treatment
of tribes based solely on geographic location" under the PIA standard as its
primary objection to the "across-the-board" application of PIA.134 The court
noted the failure of the PIA standard to award an adequate water right to
tribes in mountainous regions.35 For illustration, the following discussion
looks at the Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation, relied on by the Arizona
court, and the Chippewa Cree of the Rocky Boy's Reservation in
Montana."
6
The Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation, established in 1852, is
in the mountainous terrain of south-central New Mexico with an elevation
131. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. and Source,
35 P.3d 68,76 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V).
132. Royster, supra note 42, at 75 (noting that PIA is criticized as providing a windfall for
some tribes while at the same time it is criticized for providing too little water for reservations
with few irrigable acres); Wardlaw, supra note 86, at 382 (asserting that the PIA standard is
unfair when applied to a reservation with no irrigable acres).
133. Mergen & Liu, supra note 38, at 695 (noting the unequal treatment of tribes in alluvial
valleys versus those in mountainous terrain under the PIA standard).
134. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 78.
135. Id., citing State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
136. See generally Martinez, 861 P.2d at 246-51 (failure of tribe to prove economic feasibility
of irrigation projects in mountainous terrain); Franks, supra note 38, at 560-62 (discussing the
Mescalero Apache water right); Barbara A. Cosens, The 1997 Water Rights Settlement Between
the State of Montana and the Chippewa Cree tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation: The Role of
Community and the Trustee, 16 U.C.L.A.J.ENVTL. L. 255,290 n.151 (1998) (describing settlement
of water rights of Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation as exceeding PIA in
order to meet basic needs).
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in the area suitable for crops that grow at an elevation above 6000 feet." To
prove-up a water right under the PIA method, experts for the Tribe and the
United States went to great lengths to design creative irrigation projects that
would move water by tunnel from the Rio Ruidoso into another drainage
and provide irrigation for crops including alfalfa, barley, Christmas trees,
strawberries and asparagus."a However, the New Mexico court rejected the
notion that anything resembling practicably irrigable acreage exists on the
Reservation.' In particular, the court states,
If you use a small enough discount rate, grow an expensive
enough specialty crop, assume that market demand will
expand, and ignore enough management and labor costs, the
standard of economic feasibility adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California becomes meaningless.
The word "practicably" has been edited out."4
The Tribe's claim for 17,750 acre-feet of water per year was rejected and the
Tribe was awarded 2322 acre-feet per year,' barely enough for a domestic
water supply for a small town.
Similar to the Mescalero Apache, the Chippewa Cree of the Rocky
Boy's Reservation are located in mountainous terrain. The Rocky Boy's
Reservation lies in the Bearpaw Mountains of north-central Montana on
land formerly part of the Fort Assiniboine military reservation.42 On
February 11, 1915, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
survey Fort Assiniboine for disposal. 14 3 The survey was to identify (1) land
suitable for agriculture to be opened for settlement, (2) coal land to be
opened for settlement with coal resources reserved to the United States, (3)
timber land to be disposed of pursuant to the timber laws, and (4) mineral
land to be disposed of pursuant to the mineral laws.'" On September 16,
1916, in response to petitions by the leaders of the Chippewa and Cree
Tribes in the area, Congress amended the 1915 Act to set aside a 56,035 acre
137. Martinez, 861 P.2d at 238, 247.
138. Id. at 246-47.
139. Id. at 248-51.
140. Id. at 250.
141. State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235,238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); see also Franks,
supra note 38, at 560-62 (asserting that the Mescalero case indicates that the PIA standard is
flawed because it resulted in almost no water for the tribe).
142. General Orders and Circulars, General Field Order No. 8, Dept. of Dakota, Vol. 208,
June 28, 1881. Fort Assinniboine was established by Executive Order on March 4, 1880;
however, the boundaries were defective and were reprinted in this June 28, 1881, issuance.
143. An Act Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to Survey the Lands of the
Abandoned Fort Assiniboine Military Reservation and Open the Same to Settlement, ch. 25,




portion of the land for the Rocky Boy's Reservation, specifically designating
it for the "Rocky Boy's Band of Chippewas and such other homeless Indians
in the State of Montana as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to locate
thereon."45 The Reservation contained none of the land in the former
military reservation identified as suitable for irrigated agriculture.4
The Indian Reorganization Act, passed on June 18,1934, authorized
acquisition of lands for Indians.47 Pursuant to this authority, a 156,000-acre
area on the western border of the Reservation was designated as a
maximum purchase area for addition of land to the Rocky Boy's
Reservation." In 1938 the Bureau of Indian Affairs purchased roughly
35,500 acres within this area from private landholders for $288,000."49
Exchanges of letters between landowners and the BIA indicate that much
of the land was marginal for agricultural purposes."s
In addition to having a limited agricultural land base, the Rocky
Boy's Reservation is located in an area of scarce water supply. Annual
precipitation averages 12 inches in the Reservation area suitable for
growing hay.' Snowpack in the Bearpaw Mountains, which receive an
average of 30 inches of precipitation per year, contributes to high spring
runoff."5 2 Capture of this runoff requires expensive storage.
Application of the PIA method to the Rocky Boy's Reservation
using similar factors to those used by the New Mexico courts in reference
145. Act Providing for the Opening of the Fort Assiniboine Military Reservation, ch. 452,
39 Stat. 739 (1916).
146. General Orders and Circulars, No. 85 Headquarters of the Army, Oct. 22,1891.
147. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (1934).
148. Project Plan-Rocky Boy's Reservation, Montana (1937) (available at the National
Archives, Pacific NW Region, Fort Belknap Indian Agency, Land Acquisitions Project Files,
1937-47, Box 396). The actual outlines of the maximum purchase area were not articulated until
1939 in a Senate report. See S. REP. No. 76-105 (1939). The area outlines may have been the
result of recommendations of a group of federal officials who met in Great Falls, Montana, in
1936 to discuss the needs of Montana's landless Indians. See Letter from Superintendent
Wooldridge to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Dec. 10, 1936) (available at the National
Archives, Pacific NW Region).
149. S. REP. No. 76-105 (1939). This area was not added to the Reservation until November
26,1947, when the Assistant Secretary of the Interior signed the proclamation transferring the
land in response to an agreement with the Chippewa Cree Tribe to enroll more landless
Indians. THOMAS R. WESSEL, A HISTORY OF THE ROCKY BOY'S INDIAN RESERVATION 181 (1974)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Montana Historical Society, cited in internal
memorandum of the Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission staff).
150. Id.
151. SUSAN COTTINGHAM Er AL., TECHNICAL REPORT" COMPACT SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE
MONTANA RESERVED WATER RIGHTS COMPACT COMMISSION AND THE CHIPPEWA CREE TRIBE OF
THE ROCKY BOY'S RESERVATION ANDTHE UNITEDSTATES 20 (2001) (unpublished report prepared
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to the Mescalero Apache Reservation results in a reserved water right of
roughly zero.'53 By eliminating the requirement of economic feasibility and
using variables that reflect the need to subsidize irrigation development on
reservations and a trustee responsibility to provide potable drinking water,
a more generous reserved water right of 20,000 acre-feet per year can be
calculated."s When negotiations began to settle the water rights for the
Rocky Boy's Reservation, little thought had been given either to the legal
basis for application of PIA when it provided too little water for a tribe to
exist, or to the moral dilemma.
Finally, if the plight of mountain and northern tribes under a PIA
method is dim, what of the tribe whose prime agricultural land has been
flooded by a federal water project? This is the fate of the most irrigable land
on the Fort Berthold Reservation, drowned beneath the water backed up by
the Army Corps of Engineer's Garrison Dam. 5 Under a PIA method, the
very act of flooding the irrigable land of the reservation destroys any claim
the tribe has to the water thus impounded. These extreme results are only
necessary if courts persist in the fiction that all reservations, even those
expressly established in areas not suitable for irrigated agriculture, have an
agricultural purpose and a water right determined solely by calculation of
Practicably Irrigable Acreage.
3. An Alternative Measure of Tribal Water
In articulating a purpose that would apply to most Indian
reservations, the Arizona Supreme Court did not eliminate the need for an
inquiry particularized to each reservation. It simply moved that inquiry
from the determination of purpose to the quantification phase. The Arizona
Supreme Court's alternative ties the quantification of tribal water rights to
development of the specific reservation as a viable homeland. The measure
of the water right for a "homeland" is specific to the needs, wants, plans,
cultural background, and geographic setting of the particular reservation."5
To achieve a quantity, the Arizona court requests that the lower court be
presented with "actual and proposed uses, accompanied by the parties'
recommendations regarding feasibility and the amount of water necessary
to accomplish the homeland purpose.""'7 The development of a master land
153. Telephone Conversation with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved
Water Rights Compact Commission (june 25,2002).
154. Id. Note that this is precisely the approach rejected by the New Mexico Court in
Martinez. A water right of 20,000 acre-feet per year was ultimately recognized for the Rocky
Boy's Reservation to satisfy the development plan proposed by the Tribe. Id.
155. REISNER, supra note 43, at 195.
156. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68, 79-80 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V).
157. Id. at 79.
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use plan and the development of an economic development plan, both of
which are common approaches in settlement, are two ways to achieve this
requirement."s Under this approach, the tribe's historic and cultural uses
are relevant as well as the geography of the reservation.' 9 Thus, the
standard approach of examining historic documents to determine
reservation purpose re-appears in the Arizona Supreme Court's
quantification methodology.
The approach articulated by the Arizona Supreme Court has long
been used in interest-based settlement negotiations. For example, the "Fort
McDowell Indian Community utilized a land use plan in conjunction with
its water rights settlement based on agricultural production, commercial
development, industrial use, residential use, recreational use, and
wilderness." "6° The initial settlement proposal of the Chippewa Cree of the
Rocky Boy's Reservation called for a water right to meet the needs of a
development plan that included irrigation, commercial use (including a
meat packing plant), recreation (including snow making at the Tribe's ski
resort), domestic use, stock watering, and fish and wildlife enhancement
projects.16 The initial proposal for settlement of the water rights of the Gros
Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation was based
on a development plan that included expansion of irrigation and
enhancement of wildlife habitat.
62
None of these proposed development plans limits the water right
to existing needs nor are future needs based solely on population
projections. The U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona I specifically rejected
quantification of a reserved water right based on population trends.63
Noting this, the Arizona Supreme Court states that "[wihile it should never
be the only factor, a tribe's present and projected future population may be
158. Id. at 79-80; see also Weldon, supra note 42, at 227 (arguing for replacement of PIA with
a "true use standard" that requires a plan for development. The author goes further than the
Arizona Supreme Court in also arguing for a requirement of identification of funding sources.
For reasons discussed in part III, I do not believe this is a valid option since it ties a tribe's
water right to the vagaries of the congressional budget process.); Rusinek, supra note 44, at 407
(asserting the validity of a homeland standard and noting that under that standard a court
could require a development plan with agriculture as one component).
159. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 79-80.
160. Id. at 79, citing S. REP. No. 101-479 (1990).
161. Water Rights Compact Entered into by the State of Montana, the Chippewa Cree Tribe
of the Rocky Boy's Reservation and the United States of America 5-12 (Aug. 6,1992) (working
draft available at the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, Helena, Mont.).
162. NATURALRESOURCESCoNsULTING ENGINEERS, INC., PRELIMINARY DRAFT WATER RIGHTS
DEVELOPMENT PLAN, FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, MONTANA 17, 31 (1995) (available
at the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, Helena, Mont.).
163. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,600-01 (1963) (Arizona I).
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considered in determining water rights."' Population projections have
been used in a limited fashion in developing the portion of tribal
development plans addressing domestic use."
Each of the plans listed above turns to the specific geography,
climate, culture, and desires of the reservation in question in formulating
the plan. That each of these development plans formed the basis of a
settlement that achieved voluntary approval by tribal councils serves to
emphasize the adequacy of the approach. By considering not only the needs
but also the choices of a particular tribe, the method recognizes that no two
reservations are alike in climate, geography, culture, or aspiration.'"
III. CONCERNS WITH THE ARIZONA HOMELAND STANDARD
The determination that Indian reservations were intended as
homelands is difficult to fault. Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court
has required a finding of purpose particularized to establishment of each
reservation, the reasoning employed by the Arizona court would lead to a
finding of a homeland purpose in most cases. Where concern will be raised
with the Arizona Supreme Court's approach is in the measure of the water
rights for the homeland purpose. First, does the Arizona Supreme Court's
method result in a significant change in the measure of the water right for
agricultural reservations and, if so, does the change adversely affect
settlement or litigation that has proceeded in reliance on the validity of
PIA? Second, does the Arizona Supreme Court's method affect funding for
Indian water rights settlement given that federal criteria ties funding, in
part, to the value of the water right the United States failed to protect as
well as the value of the original claim relinquished in settlement?
A. Reliance on PIA
State courts and settling parties have proceeded since 1963 under
the assumption that a negotiated or litigated water right resembling a PIA
measure will withstand scrutiny. Thus, considerable public and private
funds have been spent undertaking the studies necessary to establish the
technical and economic feasibility of irrigation on specific Indian
164. In Re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68, 80 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila V); see also MSE-HKM ENGINEERING, MUNICIPAL, RURAL AND
INDUSTRIALWATERSUPPLYSYSTEMNEEDSASSESSMENT, ROCKY BOY'SINDIAN RESERVATION 21-26
(1996) (prepared for the Bureau of Reclamation) (available at the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission, Helena, Mont.) (using population projections to determine the
future drinking water needs of the tribe).
165. See, e.g., MSE-HKM ENGINEERING, supra note 164.
166. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 38, at 563 (criticizing PIA for ignoring need and choice).
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reservations. Would adoption of the Arizona Supreme Court approach
render this effort useless? Not necessarily.
The primary concerns with PIA expressed by the Arizona Supreme
Court are (1) PIA prevents economic diversity or change in use and (2) PIA
discriminates against northern and mountainous reservations. These
concerns are addressed by the broad scope of a development plan
associated with a homeland standard and do not require elimination of
PIA. 67 Consideration of an Indian reservation as a homeland still leaves
open the question of what type of homeland it is. The Arizona Supreme
Court calls for the utilization of master land use or economic development
plans in place of the PIA method. However, every component of a land use
or economic development plan must be accompanied by some method for
quantification of current and future water needs. Each of the development
plans discussed above included an agricultural component. Thus, resorting
to a development plan does not eliminate the need to establish a method for
quantification of the agricultural component of the water right.
Any method to quantify the agricultural portion of the homeland
water right must walk the line between the acceptance of PIA and the
rejection of a "reasonable needs" test by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona
I.L" Thus, the quantification cannot be based merely on foreseeable needs
and population projections." Courts must distinguish between the fact that
it may be necessary and prudent to develop only a portion of the tribal
water rights in the near future-an issue of funding and immediate
need--and the scope of the water right for all time. Although the Arizona
Supreme Court rejects PIA as the sole measure of tribal water rights and
points out some of its failings, nothing in the opinion precludes use of PIA
as one component of quantification. PIA remains one objective means by
which to quantify the agricultural portion of a development plan.
Evaluation of alternatives to the use of PIA in quantification of
agricultural water illustrates the difficulty in development of a different
methodology. The U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona I rejected the "reasonable
needs" test, which based water use on population projections. 7 ° Although
population projections are commonly used in determining the size of, for
example, a drinking water project over its projected 50-year life, a reserved
water right quantification is a final decree of the water right for all time. The
167. Inequities resulting from the economic feasibility portion of the PIA analysis are
beyond the scope of this article; however, modification of the standard could begin by
applying the same standard used in evaluating other federal water projects in the same basin
at the time of their development rather than a modem standard that holds tribes to a higher
level of economic scrutiny.
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U.S. Supreme Court was understandably reluctant to tie that right to the
vagaries of population growth and migration, turning instead to a land
based methodology.
The draft opinion of Justice O'Connor in Big Horn I discussed above
adheres to the land-based approach in PIA but is also problematic. Justice
O'Connor would have retained the three-step process in a PIA analysis and
then added a fourth step requiring "a 'practical' assessment-a
determination apart from theoretical economic and engineering feasibility-
of the reasonable likelihood that future irrigation projects, necessary to enable
lands which have never been irrigated to obtain water, will actually be
built.""" As noted above, this standard subjects the final quantification of
a tribal water right for all time to the political wind of today. Are we in a
balanced budget cycle? What is the political clout of neighboring off-
reservation farmers? Have we already developed all the water in this basin
for a Reclamation project? Are there water-dependent endangered species
in this basin? Such a subjective analysis is clearly at odds with Arizona I and
tends to once again blur the distinction between quantification and use.
That line is further blurred by the current federal policy on funding of
Indian water right settlements, thus linking quantification and funding in
a way that would have serious consequences should the new Arizona
approach result in a substantial reduction in the initial claims of Arizona's
tribes.
B. The Effect on Settlement Funding
Funding to implement tribal water right settlements is essential to
the health, welfare, and economic development of reservations. Currently,
although some funding is obtained through local contributions to
settlement, the bulk of implementation funding is federal.17 The following
paragraphs describe how the federal method for computation of settlement
funding uses the value of a tribe's legal claim for water as the primary basis
for the funding calculation. Just as use of PIA methodology leaves land-
poor tribes with insufficient water, the federal method of funding
calculation leaves land-poor tribes with no means to develop what little
water they are determined to have a right to.
171. Wyoming v. United States, Draft Opinion, supra note 48, at 17.
172. See, e.g., Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1274
(1982) and Pub. L. No. 102497,106 Stat. 3255 (1992) (federal project for tribes); Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement, Pub. L. No. 100-512, 102 Stat. 2549
(1988) (use of water exchanges); San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement, Pub. L. No.
102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992) (use of Central Arizona Project water); for summary table, see




The current basis for the Department of the Interior's
recommendation on funding levels for an Indian water rights settlement is
set forth in the "Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal
Government in Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Right
Claims."" The Criteria and Procedures were established pursuant to a
negotiation policy articulated by former President Bush 74 and remained
unchanged throughout the Clinton administration and thus far in the
current Bush administration.Ts
The Criteria and Procedures provide guidelines for the procedure
for federal participation in negotiations to settle Indian Water Rights and
the criteria for determining federal negotiating positions.76 Of particular
importance in the Criteria and Procedures when considering the standard
to be used for quantification of tribal water rights are (1) the evaluation of
the likely "litigation outcome" used to evaluate settlement proposals for
quantification; 7 and (2) the criteria tying federal funding to federal legal
exposure, and the criteria tying the federal position on state and local
monetary contribution to settlement to the benefits received by those
interests through reduction in the tribal water claim.'s
1. The Litigation Outcome
Calculation of the potential best- and worst-case scenario for
litigation of the tribal right provides the federal government with a bottom
173. Criteria & Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations
for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12,1990) [hereinafter
Criteria & Procedures].
174. In his statements on signing the "Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989,"
President Bush stated,
The Administration expects to continue to work toward settlement of
legitimate Indian land and water rights claims to which the Federal
Government is a party....Indian land and water rights settlements involve a
complicated blend of law, treaties, court decisions, history, social policies,
technology, and practicality. These interrelated factors make it difficult to
formulate hard-and-fast rules to determine exact settlement contributions by
the various parties involved in a specific claim....In recognition of these
difficulties, this Administration is committed to establishing criteria and
procedures to guide future Indian land and water claim settlement
negotiations including provision for Administration participation in such
negotiations.
George Bush, 1 Pub. Papers 771, 772 (June 21, 1989).
175. A Department of the Interior official, William Meyers III, in a statement at the Western
States Water Council/Native American Rights Fund Symposium on Indian Water Rights
Settlement, St. George, Utah, October 2001, indicated that the Bush administration is willing
to review the Criteria and Procedures.
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line against which the actual settlement can be measured for purposes of
determining federal support. As trustee, the federal government's support
is essential to finalization of a settlement.
Currently the PIA method of quantification is used to determine the
potential litigation outcome. The warm climate, generous soils, and flatland
location of many of Arizona's Indian reservations render application of the
PIA method likely to maximize initial tribal water right claims. The
potential size and early date of these claims has been the primary force in
driving non-reservation parties to the table to settle water rights. The
resulting momentum has led to the design of more and more elaborate
mechanisms for the trade and development of water. 9 Federal support for
these solutions, particularly in basins where other federal water interests
exist, is directly tied to the federal assessment of what a particular
reservation is entitled to."w
Settlement of water for most reservations in Arizona is at a
relatively advanced stage. 8 Federal assessment of proposed settlements
generally occurs after the components of a likely settlement are identified,
thus occurring fairly late in the process. Substantial public money has been
spent in reliance on a PIA method for Arizona tribes. 2 Introduction of a
new measure-the development plan-with details yet to be worked out
could render existing assessment obsolete and cast a shadow of uncertainty
over the ongoing federal process."s Stability in notions of rights throughout
the rather lengthy settlement process is essential to an outcome that
generates federal support. As discussed above, continued use of a PIA
method for reservations with actual irrigation potential avoids this problem.
2. Funding
In the absence of retention of PIA as the measure of the agricultural
portion of the water right, the greatest effect on Arizona tribes who are in
the middle of processes to achieve settlement of their water rights is the
effect on federal support for funding to implement those settlements.
Funding for development of tribal water and changes in water
179. See, e.g., Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1274
(1982), Pub. L. No. 102497, 106 Stat. 3255 (1992) (federal project for tribes); Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement, Pub. L. No. 100-512, 102 Stat. 2549
(1988) (use of water exchanges); San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement, Pub. L. No.
102-575,106 Stat. 4600 (1992) (use of Central Arizona Project water); summarized in CHECCHiO
& COLBY, supra note 172, at 4-5.
180. Criteria & Procedures, supra note 173,55 Fed. Reg. 9224 (Mar. 12,1990).
181. See The Online Arizona General Stream Adjudication Bulletin, at http://www.
supreme.state.az.us/wm/buletin.htm. (last modified Sept. 3, 2002).
182. Telephone Interview with Pam Williams, Solicitor's Office, Indian Affairs Division,




infrastructure necessary to implement an Indian water fights settlement
generally comes from two sources: (1) federal contribution and (2) state and
local contribution." Both components are affected by the method relied on
to calculate the measure of the tribal water right had its resolution occurred
in court.
First, the federal criteria for determining contributions to settlement
provide that "Federal contributions to a settlement should not exceed the
sum of.. .calculable legal exposure [and] Federal trust or programmatic
responsibilities.. .[that] cannot be funded through a normal budget
process." " The Department of the Interior considers four factors in this
calculation: (1) the avoided cost of litigation of the reserved water right, (2)
the value of the portion of the tribal water right claim that the tribe gives
up, (3) the value of any other claims against the United States related to
water resource management or management of other natural resources that
the tribe agrees to relinquish, and (4) cost of water development that would
generally be funded through a BIA program if there is a justification for
including the funding in the settlement rather than the BIA program
funding." However, in practice, positions taken by the Department of the
Interior in negotiations indicate that the primary focus has been on the
litigation exposure portion of this analysis. 7 The United States, as trustee
over tribal resources, is liable for failure to protect those resources.1 Thus,
federal litigation exposure is strongly influenced by the value of the
resource that the United States allegedly failed to protect. The greater the
value of the calculated tribal water right expected in litigation, the greater
the justifiable contribution.
Second, federal support for non-federal contribution is also tied to
the measure of the tribal water right claim given up in settlement. 9 The
Criteria and Procedures require the Department of the Interior to evaluate
non-federal contribution to settlement in proportion "to benefits
184. CHECCHIO& COLBY, supra note 172, at 69-70.
185. Criteria & Procedures, supra note 173,55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990).
186. Telephone interview with Richard Aldrich, Field Solicitor, U.S. Department of the
Interior (June 19, 2002).
187. Telephone interview with Susan Cottingham, Program Manager, Montana Reserved
Water Rights Compact Commission (Apr. 2, 2002).
188. See, e.g., The Fort Belknap Indian Community v. United States, Docket No. 250-A,
Indian Claims Commission; Blackfeet and Gros Ventre Tribes of Indians v. United States,
Docket No. 279-C, Indian Claims Commission, Consolidated before the Court of Claims, Order
Jan. 7,1981 (resolves claims for mismanagement of natural resources).
189. Criteria & Procedures, supra note 173,55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990). The Criteria
and Procedures are not binding on non-federal parties. Non-federal parties could circumvent
Administration support and go directly to Congress for appropriations. However, as a
practical matter, Administration support, particularly for items that have an impact on the
federal budget, is essential to finalization of a settlement.
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received."1" State and local parties are considered by the Department of the
Interior to be the beneficiaries of the water made available through
relinquishment of a portion of the tribal claim. Generally the water made
available is the difference between a tribe's credible water right claim and
a settlement quantification. This difference is between a water right
calculated under a PIA method and a smaller water right proposed under
a development plan. In short, under the Criteria and Procedures, non-
federal contribution has been calculated as the difference between PIA and
the proposed measure of the Arizona Supreme Court's homeland standard.
Elimination of the PIA method of quantification eliminates the basis for
state and local contribution. The following analysis concludes that rather
than provide a basis for questioning the Arizona Supreme Court's
approach, the problems it raises for federal funding merely emphasize the
need to revisit the federal Criteria and Procedures.
Basing federal contribution on legal exposure has never been an
appropriate measure of the federal obligation to assist tribes in
development of water supplies. Although the suggested retention of PIA to
measure the agricultural portion of a homeland water right under the
Arizona Supreme Court's.approach would alleviate part of the problem, it
does nothing to remedy the existing inequity evident in the Criteria and
Procedures. As noted above, the federal calculation of funding is strongly
tied to the value of the initial tribal claim. Just as it is cheaper to back into
a Volkswagen than a Mercedes, failure by the trustee to protect a small
water right is cheaper than failure to protect a large one. Thus, claims based
on PIA by tribes in alluvial valleys in southern climates lead to high
calculated federal legal exposure. In contrast, federal exposure for a
mountainous reservation in the north like Rocky Boy's is minimal. The
additional problems highlighted by contemplation of a new standard of
quantification may be just the impetus necessary to remedy the Criteria and
Procedures to properly reflect the federal fiduciary obligation to tribes.
C. Recommended Changes to the Federal Approach to Funding
Change in the Criteria and Procedures is necessary to reflect the
obligation of the federal trustee to ensure the ability of tribes to develop a
viable reservation homeland. The recognition of a homeland purpose by the
Arizona Supreme Court suggests the path the United States should follow
in making those changes. That path would pose the question, "What are the
water needs of a viable reservation economy, culture, and ecology?" not,




resources?" Thus, the recommended approach ties funding to the tribe's
plans for the present and future needs of its reservation.
Criticism of the Criteria and Procedures is not new. From the
outset, tribal representatives criticized both their substance and the failure
to obtain tribal comment prior to their publication."' Even federal
representatives have noted their shortcomings in calculating federal
contribution to settlement. 92 The Native American Rights Fund proposed
changes that would consider the need to attain "permanent economically
sustaining homelands for the Indians" and "the financial means necessary
for the Tribe to pursue economic development and strengthen tribal self-
governance." 93 The proposed changes have never been considered for
incorporation into the Criteria and Procedures. Notably, the proposed
changes mimic the approach of the Arizona Supreme Court by focusing on
the need to develop a reservation as a homeland. For the same reasons that
a homeland standard represents a principled approach to quantification of
Indian reserved water rights, calculation of funding at levels necessary to
develop a reservation as a homeland represents a more principled approach
than one based on litigation exposure.
Precedent exists for developing criteria tied to the economic and
water needs and development plans of a particular reservation rather than
litigation exposure. Despite the general emphasis on the legal exposure of
the federal government, the Department of the Interior under the Clinton
Administration became convinced that the trustee obligation must also be
considered where the tribal resource base is poor. Thus, despite minimal
exposure, the Department of the Interior recommended, Congress
authorized, and President Clinton signed authorization for $46 million for
development of the water resources on the Rocky Boy's Reservation.'94 The
dollar amount was tied to a water development plan proposed by the
tribe."'95 The funding fell within the scope of the Criteria and Procedures
191. See generally Eileen Shimizu, Indian Water Rights: An Examination of the Current Status
of the Department of Interior's Guidelines and the Opposition to Them, 38 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 88
(1991) (summarizing criticism by the Native American Rights Fund).
192. MichaelJ. Clinton, Settlement ofIndian Reserved Water Rights Claims, 33 NAT. REsOURCES
J. 665,668 (1993) (noting comments by OMB Manager Dave Gibbons that the criteria side of
the Criteria and Procedures is not working); see also REPORT OF THE WESTERN WATER POLICY
REviEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY Ch.
6, at 9 (1998) ("Federal contributions toward meeting [itslobligations [to Indian tribes] should
not be limited to potential federal liability for breach of trust, but should recognize a moral and
legal obligation to protect and assist the tribes.").
193. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES 2
(Sept. 12,1991) (on file with author).
194. Chippewa Cree Tribe of The Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian Reserved Water Rights
Settlement and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-163,113 Stat. 1778.
195. See Water Rights Compact (working draft), supra note 161.
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because the development was of the type normally funded through BIA
programs.'96 However, a change in the personnel in charge of the federal
Working Group on Indian Water Rights was necessary to allow this
approach to move forward. 97
Considerable inertia prevents change of federal guidelines used for
over ten years. The willingness of the Clinton administration to recognize
their inapplicability to the Rocky Boy's Reservation suggests that change
may not be needed. However, that willingness came after several years of
refusal, and only a change in the decision-making personnel at the
Department of the Interior led to a deviation from the guidelines." Because
the evaluation under the Criteria and Procedures provides the baseline
from which any deviation from those criteria is measured and because the
willingness to do so may turn on a single decision maker within the
Department of the Interior, the Criteria and Procedures should be changed.
Even though the Criteria and Procedures may be considered mere
guidelines, their change would provide notice to tribes and protection for
the Department of the Interior employees struggling to provide a coherent,
consistent, and moral approach to federal support for tribal water
development. Parallel to the adoption of a homeland standard by the
Arizona Supreme Court, that change should reflect the fact that it is only
appropriate that funding recommendations by the trustee be tied to the
need for development of water infrastructure and restoration of riparian
habitat, fisheries, and wetlands as necessary to serve the purpose of a
permanent home for Indians.
Change in the federal Criteria and Procedures to tie recommenda-
tions for funding to tribal needs and plans for economic development
would also eliminate the current discrepancy between tribes who settle and
those who litigate. By tying funding recommendations, in part, to the
avoided cost of litigation, tribes uncomfortable with negotiation face a
troubling choice: negotiate and maximize funding recommendations or
litigate and face reduced funding. Such penalty on a tribe's choice to seek
judicial resolution of a dispute is inappropriate. Change in the Criteria and
Procedures to reflect needs and plans eliminates this dilemma and, similar
to the ruling by the Arizona Supreme Court, reflects the obligation to
ensure the ability of tribes to develop reservations as permanent homes.
1%. Telephone Interview with Richard Aldrich, Field Solicitor, U.S. Department of the
Interior (June 19, 2002).
197. Telephone Interview with Susan Cottingham, Program Manager, Montana Reserved
Water Rights Compact Commission (April 2, 2002) (referring to the appointment of David
Hayes as the head of the Working Group on Indian Water Rights Settlements by Secretary of
the Interior Babbitt).




Ninety-three years after the recognition of the importance of water
to sustenance of life on Indian reservations, a state court has recognized that
the measure of the water right created is the amount necessary to actually
provide that sustenance. By articulating a homeland standard based on
tribal economic development plans, cultural needs, and historic water uses,
the Arizona Supreme Court has eliminated many of the blatant inequities
plaguing, the current approach to Indian water right quantification.
However, the standard does open the issue of the precise means for
quantification of a water right to meet that standard. Courts may turn to
experience gained in settlement for guidelines in addressing quantification
of non-agricultural water uses, but reliance on, experience with, and
objectivity of the PIA method weigh in favor of its retention for
quantification of agricultural reserved water rights in court. Should courts
instead use the new homeland standard as a basis for a reduction in
quantification of reserved water rights, the standard may have a significant
impact on the calculation of recommended levels of federal funding for
development of reserved water. Rather than providing a basis to reject the
Arizona standard, the collateral effect of a change to the Arizona homeland
standard on settlement funding merely emphasizes the need also to change
the criteria for funding to reflect the purpose of establishing reservations as
homelands.
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